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The purpose of this research effort is to determine what
changes (if any) should be made to the organizational main-
tenance level for air-launched missiles if the Naval Air
Systems Command adopts the omnibus maintenance concept. The
omnibus maintenance concept would combine the intermediate
and depot maintenance levels.
The conclusion drawn from this policy analysis is that
no changes should be made to the organizational level. Any
changes that might be considered for the organizational lev-
el would not fulfill the goal of increasing productivity for
maintaining equipment and systems as specified in the Secre-
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I. INTRODUCTION
To begin this analysis of maintenance programs for air-
launched missiles in the Navy, it is necessary to understand
the concept of the Integrated Logistics Support System
(ILSS) of the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). OPNAVINST
8600.2 [Ref. l:pg- 1-1-2] defines the Integrated Logistics
Support System as:
A comprehensive system designed to provide the management
tools required for efficient and economical utilization of
personnel and material resources to achieve readiness
objectives.
Changes are planned for current maintenance programs be-
cause a need exists for increasing efficiency and economy in
utilizing military personnel and resources. The starting
point in the analysis would be a background in the key con-
cepts and terms that are generally used in describing air-
launched missile systems.
A. AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
In order to develop an understanding of air-launched
missiles, the following descriptions of operational air-
launched missiles, as described in TM000043 [Ref. 2: pp.
3-261, are listed:
(1) HARM: a supersonic, ant iradiat ion , air-to-surface
missile.
(2) HARPOON: a subsonic, radar guided, surface attack
guided missile.
(3) PHOENIX: a radar guided, air-to-air, high explosive,
long range missile.
(4) SHRIKE: a passive radar guided, air-to-ground
missile.
(5) SIDEWINDER: a supersonic, infrared guided, air-to-
air, short range missile.
(6) SPARROW: a supersonic, radar guided, air-to-air,
medium range missile.
(7) SKIPPER: a laser guided, rocket propelled, air-to-
surface missile.
(8) TOW: a wire guided, optical sight, high explosive,
air-to-surface missile.
(9) HELLFIRE: a laser guided, air-to-surface missile.
(10) WALLEYE: a television guided glide bomb.
B. NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
OPNAVINST 8600.2 [Ref. l:pg. 1-1-2] describes the Naval
Air Systems Command as responsible for "The research, de-
sign, development, test, acquisition, quality evaluation and
logistics support of all airborne weapons." The analysis
presented here will deal specifically with the maintenance
portion of logistics support. The other areas of
responsibility (such as design, development, test, etc.)
would not belong in an analysis of maintenance since the
policy for maintenance organization has been established and
is not being developed.
Naval Air Systems Command acts as the coordinating au-
thority, according to OPNAVINST 8600.2 [Ref. l:pg. 1-1-2],
in providing:
... the airborne weapons maintenance policy guidance, pro-
cedures, technical direction and management review of the
program [Naval Airborne Weapons Maintenance Program] at
each level of maintenance, i.e., depot, intermediate and
organizational
.
It is Naval Air Systems Command, acting as the coordi-
nating authority for maintenance of air-launched missiles,
that is considering changing the present maintenance
structure.
C. AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILE MAINTENANCE
The Naval airborne weapons maintenance program is di-




These levels are defined in OPNAVINST 8600.2 [Ref. l:pp.
1-1-7, 8] as follows:
Organizational Maintenance :
Organizational maintenance consists of those functions
normally performed by an operating unit on a day-to-day
basis in support of its own operations. Organizational
Maintenance is usually accomplished by weapons personnel
assigned to a maintenance department to support the mis-
sions and tasks of the performing activity. Organiza-
tional maintenance may be accomplished at the next higher
[intermediate maintenance] level. Organizational level




(3) Weapons handling, uploading and downloading.
(4) On-aircraft test of armament system and weapon as
required.
(5) Installation and removal of wings, fins, fuzes,
arming wires, etc.
Intermediate Maintenance :
Intermediate maintenance is the responsibility of, and is
normally performed by Naval Weapons Stations (WPNSTAs) and
Mobile Missile Maintenance Units (MMMUs) in support of us-
ing organizations. This level of maintenance normally
consists of testing Al 1 -Up-Rounds (AURs) and section re-
placement and also includes the following:
(1) Receipt, Segregation, Storage and Issue (RSSI) of
airborne weapons, sections and all-up-rounds.
(2) Repair, test, modification and/or check of desig-
nated intermediate level test equipment.
(3) Intermediate level calibration of designated equip-
ments.
(4) Providing technical assistance and field teams,
when required, to the supported units.
(5) Assembly, disassembly, testing, and package/un-
packaging of weapons and sections.
(6) Storage and storage monitoring.
(7) Performing authorized repair of Weapons Replacement
Assemblies (WRAs) using Shop Replaceable Assemblies
(SRAs)
.
(8) Disposition of all Weapons Replacement Assemblies
and Shop Replaceable Assemblies to depot level
maintenance which are Beyond Capability of Mainte-
nance (BCM) at this level.
Selected Intermediate Maintenance :
When authorized and so designated as an Intermediate Main-
tenance Activity (IMA), a Naval Air Station (NAS), Marine
Air Group (MAG), or Shipboard Weapons Department performs
some or all of the following maintenance actions:
(1) Receipt, storage and issue of airborne weapons,
sections and all-up-rounds.
(2) Minor repair.
(3) Assembly, disassembly, testing and packaging/un-
packaging of weapons and sections.
(4) Storage monitoring.
Depot Maintenance :
Depot maintenance is performed on airborne weapons commod-
ities requiring major overhaul or a complete rebuilding of
parts. It includes assemblies, subassemblies and the end
items, including the manufactured parts, modifications,
testing and reclamation. Depot maintenance activities
support lower categories of maintenance by providing tech-
nical assistance and performing that maintenance beyond
the capability of the lower level activities. It provides
more extensive facilities for repair than lower level
maintenance activities. Those functions may be grouped as
follows:
(1) Overhaul and major repair of airborne weapons, sec-
tions and certain related support equipment.
(2) Maintenance of test equipment.
(3) Incorporation of designated technical directives.
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(4) Modification of airborne weapons, sections, compo-
nents and certain related equipment.
(5) Manufacture/modification of designated parts/kits.
Depot and intermediate activities may have the ca-
pability to perform some lower level maintenance
actions as defined above.
D. THE ALL-UP-ROUND CONCEPT
The organizational and intermediate maintenance levels
are presently utilizing the all-up-round concept for all
missiles received aboard aircraft carriers (CV/CVN/CVA) , am-
phibious helicopter carriers (LHA/LPH) and ammunition supply
ships ( AEs)
.
The All -Up-Round (AUR) concept evolved from the Chief of
Naval Operation's Improved Rearming Rate System ( IRRS)
.
OPNAVINST 8600.2 [Ref. Ipg. 2-9-1] describes the Improved
Rearming Rate System as follows:
The Improved Rearming Rate System was initiated to maxi
mize the full capability of the carrier based aircraft.
The overall objective of Improved Rearming Rate System is
to achieve maximum effectiveness of integration and coor-
dination among operating systems directed at minimizing
initial sortie response time and sortie recycle time.
The objectives of the Improved Rearming Rate System are:
(1) to optimize support equipment quantities and capa-
bil it ies.
(2) to optimize airborne weapon strike up' rates.
(3) to optimize airborne weapon strike down^ rates.
(4) to optimize methodology training for weapons per-
sonnel .
(5) to minimize sortie recycle time.
(6) to minimize alongside time for replenishment.
' strike up: uploading the missile for flight.
^strike down: downloading and stowage of the missile
after flight.
The all-up-round is a fully assembled missile system
which is treated as a single unit. It requires minimal in-
spection or testing while onboard ship. The only authorized
disassembly of the all-up-round is at a Naval Weapons Sta-
tion or a Mobile Missile Maintenance Unit. Shipboard per-
sonnel are restricted to performing "go/no-go" tests of the
all-up-round when it is installed on the aircraft.
Prior to the establishment of the Improved Rearming Rate
System and the all-up-round, air launched missiles were
transported and stowed as separate components. The explo-
sive components (warhead and propulsion sections) were seg-
regated from the inert components (guidance, seeker and
control sections). Aboard ship, the inert sections were
periodically tested and assembled into an all-up-round, then
placed in a ready-service^ magazine. With different missile
types, standardization of maintenance was difficult.
The Improved Rearming Rate System for the all-up-round
concept moved the assembly point from the shipboard environ-
ment to the Naval Weapons Stations. The depot would trans-
port the individual components to the Naval Weapons Station
where the m_ssiles would be assembled into all-up-rounds for
delivery to the fleet. The all-up-rounds would be packaged
in containers which stressed minimal handling conditions and
maximum stowage density configurations.
^ ready service: fully assembled and ready to be placed
on the aircraft
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Onboard the ships, the fully assembled all-up-rounds
would remain in their shipping containers and stored in mag-
azines. The all-up-rounds would remain in their containers
until needed, at which point the missile would be removed
from its container and placed in ready service. Unless
specifically designated as requiring periodic checkout or
issue to ready service, the all-up-rounds would remain in
"deep stowage"" and not moved until the completion of the
deployment (6-9 months). If a missile is used in flight
(captive flight), then it must return to the intermediate
level for inspection and testing. OPNAVINST 8600.2 [Ref.
l:pg. 3-2-2] explains the reason for the extensive mainte-
nance on captive flight missiles as primarily:
. . . due to the repetitive requirement to energize the in-
ternal components of the missile during tests on the air-
craft during training missions, aborted tactical missions,
and the forces of acceleration/deceleration associated
with the carrying aircraft.
Missiles that are removed from their containers are used to
the point where they can no longer pass aircraft tests. It
is only then that the missile is removed from ready service
and another missile from "deep stowage" takes its place.
OPNAVINST 8600.2 [Ref. l:pg. 3-2-21 explains the reason for
this action as follows:
deep stowage: OPNAVINST 8600.2 [Ref. l:pg. 3-2-4]:
"Missiles or components stored in an environmentally




This extensive maintenance can be minimized by captive
carrying [captive flight] a missile repetitively until the
missile experiences a verified failure as indicated by the
aircraft test system, end of deployment, or until the MDD
[Maintenance Due Date] is reached.
E. THE OMNIBUS MAINTENANCE CONCEPT
The omnibus maintenance concept is being considered by
Naval Air Systems Command to fulfill productivity goals or-
dered by the President. This concept combines the intermedi-
ate and depot maintenance levels into one intermediate/depot
level. Under this new maintenance concept, a suspect or de-
fective all-up-round would be returned directly from the or-
ganizational level to the intermediate/depot level. A point
paper produced for AIR 418 [Ref. 5:pg. 11 states:
Functions currently performed at the intermediate level
would be eliminated and would be performed at the new in-
termediate/depot level under this concept.
The omnibus maintenance concept evolved as a result of
Executive Order 12552 of February 25, 1986 [Ref. 4:pg.
7041] :
There is hereby established a government -wide program to
improve the quality, timeliness, and efficiency of ser-
vices provided by the Federal government. The goal of the
program shall be to improve the quality and timeliness of
service to the public, and to achieve a 20 percent pro
ductivity increase in appropriate functions by 1992. Each
Executive department and agency will be responsible for
contributing to the achievement of this goal.
This Executive Order lead to the establishment of Action
'88 by the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) in order to ful-
fill the requirements stated in Executive Order 12552. In a
message sent by the Secretary of the Navy on 17 Nov 1986
12
[Ref. 5], the focus of Action '88 was directed towards the




The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and
Logistics) directed the productivity improvement effort to-
wards a combined intermediate and depot maintenance level
(the omnibus concept) utilizing the all-up-round philosophy
The intermediate/depot level would perform all of the func-
tions of the current intermediate level except those func-
tions associated with Receipt, Storage, and Issue (RS&I)
functions at the waterfront.
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II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Naval Air Systems Command is considering adapting the
intermediate/depot maintenance level to air-launched mis-
siles (the omnibus maintenance concept). The analysis of
this research effort is centered on what changes (if any)
should be made at the organizational level of maintenance if
the intermediate/depot level is created.
The present logistics chain for missile repair is:
(1) SHIP< >Naval Weapons Station< >DEPOT
If the organizational level assumes the repair capability
which now exists at the Naval Weapons Stations, then the lo-
gistics chain would be shortened to:
(2) SHIP< >DEPOT
with the Naval Weapons Stations acting as a transfer point
for missiles from ship to shore and vise versa.
The omnibus maintenance concept would combine the inter-
mediate and depot levels, creating the following logistics
chain
:
(3) SHIP< > INTERMEDIATE /DEPOT
with the Naval Weapons Station acting as a transfer point.
The difference between logistics chain (2) and (3) is
that intermediate level repairs would be accomplished on-
board the ship, as opposed to logistics chain (3), which
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would continue the all-up-round concept for onboard mis-
siles maintenance.
A. ASSUMPTIONS
The ability to repair missiles onboard the aircraft car-
rier would increase the probability of retaining a missile
which would have been offloaded had that capability not ex-
isted. This assumes that the repairs are of a nature which
the shipboard personnel are capable of satisfactorily com-
pleting with functional test equipment and that the neces-
sary repair parts were available in the ship's inventory.
To achieve this repair capability, the facility, test
equipment, personnel, training, and supply parts must be ac-
commodated onboard the ship. This assumes that the ship has
the area and weight allowance to handle the increased volume
and weight which this type of facility would necessitate.
There are also assumptions to be made concerning the fu-
ture environment in which the intermediate/depot level main-
tenance will operate. An AIR 418 Industry Brief of July,
1987 [Ref. 6:pg. 31 list these assumptions as follows:
Current World Political environment will remain stable
No major confrontation - small exigencies only
Current weapons will not be phased out
Fiscal outlook is austere
Increased competition for national resources
Maintenance budget growth will not match inventory
growth
Military construction budgets will remain stable or de-
crease
Fiscal accountability and execution will be stressed
15
Missiles and UAV/RPVs' will drive the maintenance workload





B. LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF A REPRESENTATIVE MISSILE SYSTEM
A way to approach this analysis is to determine the
point where the organizational and intermediate maintenance
levels can be differentiated and increase current efficien-
cies in logistic support. To do this, the following areas





A detailed description of one type of missile would il-
lustrate the problems inherent in altering the logistic'
s
system of the remaining operational missile systems. The
representative missile in this analysis will be the HELLFIRE
Integrated Logistic Support Plan.
HELLFIRE Integrated Logistic Support Plan
a. Maintenance
A complete description of the maintenance levels
for the HELLFIRE missile is contained in the Integrated Lo-
gistic Support Plan ( I LSP No. MS-067). The Integrated Lo-
^ UAV : Unmanned air vehicle
RPV: Remotely piloted vehicle
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gistic Support Plan uses the three maintenance levels, with
the intermediate level differentiated into Fleet (shipboard
personnel) and Naval Weapons Station personnel. I LSP No.
MS-067 [Ref. 7:pp. 3-11 - 3-12] describes these levels:
Maintenance Concept Details - Tactical Missile
a. Organizational Level
(1) Visual inspection for damage
(2) Uploading/downloading of missiles
(3) Visual inspection of mating with launcher
(4) Use of aircraft BIT^ capabilities to test
the following while the missile is loaded
on the aircraft:
(a) HELLFIRE missile control system
(b) Launcher
(c) Missile
(5) Clean the seeker lens
b. Intermediate Level Fleet
(1) All-up-round decanning and canning [from the
container]
(2) Visual inspection for damage and corrosion
(3) Corrosion control
(4) Return all-up-round to Naval Weapons Station
c. Intermediate Level Naval Weapons Station
(1) All-up-round decanning and canning
(2) Visual inspection for damage and corrosion
(3) Corrosion control
(4) All-up-round test
(5) Fault isolation of all-up-round to a section
(seeker, warhead, propulsion or control)
(6) Remove/replace faulty section
(7) Recert if icat ion of all-up-round
(8) Prepare faulty section for transportation
(9) Return of faulty section to the Designated
Overhaul Point (DOP) /Depot
(10) Remove/ replace wire harness enclosure
(11) Remove/replace intermediate and rear launch
shoes
(12) Remove/ replace seeker mounting frame
assembly
(13) Prepare all-up-round for shipping and storage




Repair of missile sections beyond capability
of maintenance of the Naval Weapons Station
The present system of maintenance, as listed above, has
a distinct difference between the intermediate level (fleet)
and the intermediate level (Naval Weapons Station). The in-
termediate level (Naval Weapons Station) can perform inter-
mediate level (fleet) maintenance actions. However, the
intermediate level (Naval Weapons Station) performs more de-
tailed maintenance procedures including fault isolation of
the missile sections. The dividing line between intermedi-
ate level (fleet) and intermediate level (Naval Weapons Sta-
tion) is drawn at the ability to localize and repair faults
in the various sections of the missiles. It is necessary,
therefore, to describe the support equipment that would be
required to accomplish this area of maintenance,
b. Test and Support Equipment
Continuing with the HELLFIRE missile, ILSP No.
MS-067 [Ref. 7:pg. 6-11 describes the test equipment




Organizational Level Test Sets
No missile test sets are required at the organiza-
tional level.
2. Intermediate Level Test Sets (Fleet)
No missile test sets are required at the intermediate
level (fleet).
3. Intermediate Level Test Set (Naval Weapons Station)
The TS-lOO Missile Test Set (including the 825 adap-
ter) [Figure 1], is an Army missile test set which











te those normally provided by the air-
and monitors the response of the
imulated target. The test set obtains
power from 115 volt A.C. and 220 volt
power. The 50- foot cables and the fix-
to support the missile test cell and to
int in case of an inadvertent motor fir-
t are part of the test set. The physi-
of the test set are shown in Table 1:































































FIGURE 1. TS-lOO TEST SET'
^Source: I LSP No. MS-067 [Ref. 7:pg. 6-83
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TABLE 1. TS-lOO Missile Test Set Physical Properties'
Dimensions (Inches) Weight
Equipment Width Height Depth ( lb) (±1556)
Mainframe Assembly 67.88 61.38 25.50 1800
Remote Console 22.16 61.38 25.63 150
Assembly
Electronic Adapter 16.50 10.75 12.25 40
Assembly
Vibration Table 30.00 46.00 54.75 760
Assembly
Target Simulator 27.00 46.00 26.00 125
Assembly
4. Maintenance Concept For Missile Associated Peculiar
Support Equipment
The maintenance tasks during in-service use of missile as-
sociated Peculiar Support Equipment ( PSE ) are as follows:
a. Organizational Level - None
b. Intermediate Level (Fleet) - None
c. Intermediate Level (Naval Weapons Station) - TS-lOO







Calibration as scheduled/ required
Corrosion control
Repair actions to be defined in the
Maintenance Plan
Fault isolation to component level
Removal /replacement of Automatic Test Equipment
(ATE) components not coded for Designated Over-
haul Point repair
Return of faulted Designated Overhaul Point
coded items to the Designated Overhaul Point
d. Depot Level - TS-lOO Missile Test Set
All PSE maintenance functions beyond the capability of
intermediate maintenance will be performed at the
Designated Overhaul Point.
The ability to localize and repair faults in missile
sections is made possible with the TS-lOO missile test set.
Source ILSP No. MS-067 [Ref. 7:pg. 6-2]
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If the propulsion section is to be tested, then safety re-
quirements mandate that the facility is adapted to protect
against the inadvertent firing of the propellant.
c. Facilities
ILSP No. MS-067 [Ref. 7:pp. 8-16 - 8-17] lists
the following equipment that would be accommodated onboard a
ship if the missile maintenance is upgraded to intermediate
level (Maval Weapons Station):
Naval Weapons Station Facilities Requirements for USN
Intermediate level - Naval Weapons Station Missile
Maintenance Facility
Equipment to be accommodated:




(2) Missile test stand (vibration table assem-
bly)'
Target simulator assembly
(3) Single missile all-up-round container
(4) Section containers
(5) All-up-rounds and missile sections
(6) Overhead hoist
(7) Hoisting beam
(8) Missile assembly stand
(9) Launch shoe alignment tool
(10) Grounding strap assembly
d. Personnel Training
If intermediate level abilities are to be accom-
plished onboard a ship, then the area of training required
for shipboard personnel would be the type of training which
Naval Weapons Station personnel receive in order to service
'The missile test stand bolted to the floor is capable
of restraining the missile in the event of accidental
motor ignition.
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missile systems. Training for the other maintenance levels
would remain the same. ILSP No. MS-067 [Ref. 7:pp. 4-3]
describes this training as follows:
Naval Weapons Station Personnel Training
RI'^ will provide for the training in maintenance and op-
eration of the TS-lOO test set including the assembly/dis-
assembly of the missile for the Naval Weapons Station
personnel as indicated . .
.
Training Requirement
HELLFIRE Intermediate Maintenance - Naval Weapons Station
Obiect ive
To provide training for intermediate maintenance personnel
at Naval Weapons Station Fallbrook and Naval Weapons Sta-
tion Yorktown, ... for the HELLFIRE missile, including
missile theory and functional analysis, can/decan, opera-
tion and maintenance of TS-lOO missile test set and
missile containers.
C. OBJECTIVES
The objective of the omnibus maintenance concept is to
increase system productivity. Productivity is defined in
Mansfield [Ref. 8:pg. 511] as "The ratio of output to
input." Gaither [Ref. 9:pg. 654] expands on the concept of
productivity in terms of improvement as follows:
Improving productivity means a continuous effort to drive
down the cost of doing business. This activity involves
reducing material costs, shipping costs, costs of produc-
tion workers, cost of white collar or knowledge workers,
and all overhead costs. This objective must be balanced
by a cost objective which would be tied directly to
increasing that productivity.
For this analysis, the criteria of productivity would be
cost considerations for input and availability considera-
Rockweil International
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tions for output. Availability in this context would be the
probability that an air-launched missile will be available





The optimal figure for availability would be 100%. This
would result in always having the missile system ready for
use. If each ship were modified in order to complete in-
termediate level (Naval Weapons Station) repairs, then
availability would increase by the amount that is now lost
through the transportation delays of returning a defective
missile back to the Naval Weapons Station. However, the in-
crease of availability resulting from the ability to do re-
pairs would be offset by the delays in repair time on the
missile, repair time on the test equipment, parts delay (if
that specific part is not aboard) and personnel delay (if
the technician responsible for the repair is not available).
2. Cost Analysis
To balance availability, costs must be considered in or-
der to determine what resources will be used. Blanchard
[Ref. 10: pp. 369-399] uses a cost breakdown structure which
can be modified for this example:
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a. Operations and Maintenance cost:
Blanchard [Ref. 10:pg. 379-380] describes this
category as follows:
Includes all costs associated with the operation and main
tenance support of the system throughout its life cycle
subsequent to equipment delivery in the field. Specific
categories cover the cost of system operation, mainte-
nance, sustaining logistic support, equipment modifica-
tions, and system/equipment phaseout and disposal.
By examining the maintenance actions and facilities needed
for each maintenance level , a change in the shipboard orga-
nizational level would increase each of the following costs
in the operations and maintenance cost category described by
Blanchard [Ref. 10:pp. 379-390 3:
(1) Operating cost
(2) Operating personnel cost
(3) Operator training cost
(4) Operational facilities cost
(5) Support and handling equipment cost
(6) Maintenance cost
(7) Maintenance personnel and support cost
(8) Corrective maintenance cost
(9) Preventive maintenance cost
(10) Spare/repair parts cost
(11) Test and support equipment cost
(12) Transportation and handling cost
(13) Maintenance training cost
(14) Maintenance facility cost
(15) Technical data cost
(16) System/equipment modification cost
b. Initial logistic support cost
This is a one-time cost added to the operations
and maintenance cost which would be created if the present
maintenance policy is altered for the organizational level
-




Includes all integrated logistic support planning and con
trol functions associated with the development of system
support requirements, and the transition of such require
ments from supplier(s) to the applicable operational site.
This initial logistic support cost category includes the
following costs described in Blanchard [Ref. 10:pp. 377-
378] :
(1) Logistic program management cost
(2) Cost of provisioning
(3) Initial spare/repair part material cost
(4) Initial inventory management cost
(5) Cost of technical data preparation
(6) Cost of initial training and training
equipment
(7) Acquisition cost of operational test and
support equipment
(8) Initial transportation and handling cost
E. ALTERNATIVES
The organizational maintenance level could be altered in
one of three ways:
(1) Status quo: no change in the organizational mainte-
nance level
.
(2) Increase the organizational maintenance level for
the fleet with repairs limited to those which would not
require the use of test equipment.
(3) Increase the organizational maintenance level to
include the ability to localize and repair faults in the
missile system down to individual component parts (warhead,
propulsion, guidance, seeker and control sections). This
alternative is one that would return the organizational
level to a status quo ante which existed before the intro-
duction of the all-up-round concept.
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There is a distinction between alternatives (2) and (3).
The ability to localize and repair faulty components results
in an "all or nothing" decision when the facility alteration
and test equipment expenditure is realized. It would not be
possible to accomplish any testing of a missile system with-
out an equipment set-up such as that in Fig. 1. This will
change if an "all-purpose" test set is developed and all
missile systems are modified in a way that allows testing on
this one test set. For this analysis, an additional assump-
tion will be made that the "all-purpose" test set will not
be operational and could be neglected as an alternative.
F. IMPACTS
If alternative (1) (status quo) is considered, then the
intermediate/depot maintenance level would not be affected
by the organizational level. Missiles would continue to be
delivered as all-up-rounds to the ships via Naval Weapons
Stations- An adverse impact of this alternative is an in-
termediate/depot level maintenance facility that is not lo-
cated near a Naval Weapons Station. This would require
extending the transportation loop which could be subject to
logistic delays.
Alternative (2) requires consideration of logistic de-
lays in spare part requirements and the increase of the
present parts supply onboard each ship to accommodate this
change. The actual repairs that can be accomplished by
shipboard personnel is very limited without the capability
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to test component parts of the missiles. From the mainte-
nance descriptions of the HELLFIRE, the intermediate level
(Naval Weapons Station) has four external repairs to the
missile which could be done without localizing and repairing
the components. However, these repairs are accomplished by
the intermediate/depot level as part of their all-up-round
assembly and would be necessary in the instances where ship-
board handling has damaged external parts. The impact of
this decision would be the costs associated with supplying
the repair parts and the improvement of technical skills
required of the shipboard personnel.
Alternative (3) (status quo ante) would decrease the
transportation loop for missiles which would have been re-
turned to a Naval Weapons Station because of faulty com-
ponents or external damage. The adverse impacts are
considerably higher than the single favorable impact listed
above. These impacts would result from the consideration of
costs and modifications which would be balanced against
shortening of the transportation loop. Shipboard modifi-
cation would be greatly impacted by this alternative when
considering the volume and weight of each of the test sets
(Table 1). All costs listed in the cost analysis would be
substantial with each category adding to the total cost im-
pact. The additional impact of test set availability would




The reason for the omnibus concept is to enhance produc-
tivity as specified in the Action '88 goals. In considering
the organizational maintenance level, the greatest impact to
the goal of productivity would be the ability to service
missile systems onboard the ships. Availability of missile
systems would increase over the present configuration, how-
ever, this would cause a greater expenditure of resources to
accompl ish.
A. EVALUATION
The status quo alternative can be viewed from a set of
results from the latest deployment of an aircraft carrier.
U.S.S. Constellation 1987 Deployment
The U.S.S. Constellation (CV-63) has completed an ex-
tended deployment to the Western Pacific which included Ara-
bian Sea operations. The following is a table (Table 2) of
percentages of missiles used on this deployment:
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TABLE 2. LIST OF PERCENTAGES OF MISSILES USED BY
U.S.S. CONSTELLATION (CV-63) 1987 DEPLOYMENT''
% REMOVED % REMOVED FOR % OF FAILED















The percentages of missiles which failed aircraft tests is
greater than those which failed due to external damage.
This would suggest that the majority of missiles returned to
the intermediate level (Naval Weapons Station) required the
capability to repair component parts.
The list of missiles used on this deployment is limited
to a small number of the inventory that is available (as
shown in the the list of the air-launched missiles in the
introduction). Therefore, the decision for choosing the
status quo ante alternative has the additional burden of
deciding what missile systems to support with test sets.
The status quo ante alternative becomes less suited to
the productivity goals of the omnibus concept when procure-
ment is considered. The number of test sets required would
''Source: Corbett [Ref. Ill
'5% of missiles had damaged radome , remainder failed
tone test [built-in-test]
''43% of failed missiles were broken radomes, remainder
failed tone test
*'
'missiles failed due to coolant leaks
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be calculated as the number of missile systems multiplied by
the number of ships which would be considered for the modi-
fications. Table 3 lists the numbers of air-launched mis-
sile ships from Polmar [Ref. 12:pp. 80, 185, 2391:
TABLE 3. AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILE SHIPS
Ship type Active Scheduled to be built
Aircraft carriers 14 3
(CV, CVN, CVA)
Amphibious helicopter
carriers ( LHA , LPH) 12
Ammunition ships (AE) 13
TOTAL: 42 ships
The status quo ante alternative should be viewed not
only in numbers of test sets, but also in terms of the
weight and volume of each of the test sets (the HELLFIRE
weight and volume as an example) that would be added to the
configuration of each of the ship types. All operational
ships have long since abandoned the status quo ante alter-
native. An example of this is the U.S.S. Constellation (CV-
63) which has modified the previous missile repair areas for
other uses. The addition of any missile test set would re-
quire extensive modification to shipboard systems in order
to accommodate a list of equipment such as that for the
HELLFIRE (described earlier in this study). If the ability
to isolate faults in the propulsion section is considered,
then substantial safety requirements have to be met in order
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to minimize the accidental ignition of the missile. These
safety requirements would require a space onboard the ship
where the rocket motor can burn without injury to personnel
or equipment.
The final area of concern that needs to be considered
for the status quo ante alternative is the upgrading of
personnel training necessary to accomplish the repairs that
are now done by Naval Weapons Station personnel. The limit-
ed training of all-up-round maintenance and handling that
exists for shipboard personnel is geared to treating the
missile systems as whole units. An upgrade in training
would require a substantial increase in the technical know-
ledge of electronic repair for the present shipboard per-
sonnel. This upgrade would require an increase in the
number of instructors and modification of present teaching
facilities to accomplish that purpose. The additional tech-
nical training would require either the recruitment of new
technical personnel from the outside or the transfer of
shipboard personnel for training.
The remaining alternative (upgrading organizational
level to repairs which require no fault isolation of indi-
vidual components) has similar drawbacks as the status quo
ante alternative. The productivity goals would not be met
with this alternative when the costs of supplying each ship
with the necessary repair parts is considered. The addi-
tional training and repair facility modifications that would
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be required to accomplish these repairs would also add to
the cost of implementation. In Table 2, only the SPARROW
missile would benefit from this alternative. The remaining
failed missiles would require the ability to isolate faults.
As a whole, the upgrade in repair abilities would not justi-
fy the modification of the present organizational level when
the cost of the modification is compared to the number of
missiles involved.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusion that is drawn from the analysis is that
the organizational maintenance level remain "as is" in the
omnibus maintenance concept. The productivity goals of
Action '88 would be best served with the organizational
level remaining as specified in the Naval Airborne Weapons
Maintenance Program (OPNAVINST 8600.2). The remaining two
alternatives would not meet the goal of increased productiv-
ity when cost impacts are considered. The benefits which
could be found in these two alternatives are outweighed by
the cost in resources.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The ability to isolate and repair faults in a missile
system would require the use of individual test sets for
each system. A move towards standardizing the missile sys-
tems to only one test set would change the final outcome of
this analysis. The complexity and costs associated with
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upgrading the organizational level would not be the same if
a single portable test facility were available to the fleet.
The recommendation of this research effort is a possible
study of the feasibility of a general test set for all oper-
ational and developmental missile systems. This would re-
quire logistic support analysis from the developmental and
deployment phases of the acquisition process.
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